

## WAR AND STRATEGY

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Political Science 379  
Office Hrs: Mon. & Thurs. 4:00-5:00 pm  
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### **Course Description**

The goal of this course is to examine the nature and use of military power in the international system and the challenge of devising strategies to achieve ones ends while avoiding wars if possible and wining wars if they become necessary. In essence this course looks at how strategy is used to link military means to political goals.

This course will not directly or primarily focus on the questions of war and peace in the international system but is will examine how strategic decision-making affects them. Similarly, although this course will often drawn on current policy debates it is not a current events course.

Students taking this course are expected to have taken Political Science 115 and 282 and it is unlikely that you will do well in this course if you do not have a familiarity with important concepts in international relations such as anarchy, the balance of power, security dilemma, etc.

### **Course Requirements**

Do the assigned readings! It is essential that you complete the reading before the class meeting for which they were assigned. Without this you will not get as much out of the lectures. Similarly you should attend all or most of the class meetings. Being frequently absent from and unprepared for class will be reflected in your work and will affect your grade.

Given the size of the class it is unlikely that we will be able to have regular class discussion. However, whenever possible students will be encouraged to share their opinions on competing arguments.

The grade for the course will consist of four assignments:

#### **Two Short Briefs on the assigned readings (each 15%)**

*Due:* at the beginning of the class for which the reading was assigned

These should be 2-4 pages long, double-spaced. For each brief, pick a reading and then analyze it as follows:

1. What is the author's main argument?
2. What theoretical and/or empirical support does the author give for his/her argument?
3. Critically assess the argument being made: Did you find the argument convincing? And more importantly: Why or why not?

Students should email me by September 9 with at least four topics they are interested in writing a brief for. Students will then be assigned two topics (every effort will be made to give students their top choices) and students will then be free to pick any assigned reading from these two topics to write a brief on.

### **Take-home Midterm (30%)**

*Due:* Beginning of class Thursday **October 28**

You will be given a list of two to three questions a week before the midterm is due. You will pick one of these questions and address it in a 5-7 page double-spaced paper. More details about the midterm will be given as the due date approaches.

### **Final Paper (40%)**

*Due:* Beginning of class **December 9**

For the paper you should pick a suitable topic related to the materials covered in the class and write a 10-12 page that discusses an important empirical puzzle or policy question. Students should submit their proposed topic to the instructor for approval on or before **October 21**. More details about the final paper will be given as the due date approaches.

### **Late penalty**

All assignments are due at the beginning of class. Except in the case of a valid and documented medical or family emergency, students will lose a third of a grade for each day that their assignment is late. Thus if you hand in an assignment a day late and you get an A- on it your grade will be a B+.

Students must submit all assignments in hard copy form. I will not accept assignments in the form of an email attachment.

### **Course Materials:**

#### *Recommended Books*

Students are encouraged to purchase the following, as they are not mandatory they have not been ordered from the Hunter College Bookstore however they are available from either Barnes&Noble.com or Amazon.com:

Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics. Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).

Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

Betts, Richard K. ed., Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace rev. ed. (New York: Longman, 2002).

Lavoy, Peter R.; Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Longman, 2004).

A course package is also being prepared at Whole Sale Copies. I will email the class once this is ready for purchase.

Course readings not included in the assigned books may be accessed at the Hunter College Library reserve desk and/or by and downloading available articles with a college proxy access account. Some materials may also be posted on the Course Web page on Blackboard.

### **Course Schedule:**

Note: *Lectures may depart from strict adherence to this schedule. Additional reading may be assigned but only with at least one week's advance notice.*

#### **I. Introduction: Sound Strategy and the Realities of War** (September 9 and 13)

Paul Fussell, Wartime (Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 18 "The Real War Will Never Get in the Books."

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976), Book I, chaps. 1, 2, 7. (Read only this translation.)

Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5-50.

K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chaps. 1-2.

#### **II. Concepts: Uses of Force, Strategy and Military Doctrine** (September 20 and 23)

Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Cornell University Press, 1984), chap. 1.

Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," excerpt from "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, vol. 4 (Spring 1980), reprinted in Art and Jervis, International Politics.

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), chap. 1. reprinted in Art and Jervis, International Politics as "The Diplomacy of Violence."

Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy," (excerpted in Art and Jervis, International Politics)

#### **III. Explaining Strategic Outcomes** (September 27 and 30)

Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-17.

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-410.

Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 16-35.

Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," The National Interest, no. 71 (Spring 2003), pp. 29-40.

Robert Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," in Robert Jervis, et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 20-33.

#### **IV. Integrating Political Ends and Military Means: Technology, Doctrine, and Socioeconomic Factors**

(October 4, 7 and 14)

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (Jan. 1978), pp. 167-214 (excerpted in Art and Jervis, International Politics and Betts, Conflict After the Cold War).

Jack Snyder, "Civil Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984)

Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-76 (in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War).

Niccolo Machiavelli, "Money is Not the Sinews of War, although it is Generally so Considered" in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War.

#### **V. Deterrence, Crisis Bargaining, and Reputation**

(October 18 and 21)

John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), chaps. 2, 4.

Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-87.

Fearon, James, "Signaling vs. the Balance of Power and Interests" Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 38 (June 1994), pp. 236-69.

\*Scott D. Sagan "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks" International Security vol. 24 no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115.

#### **VI. Coercion, Coercive Air Power and Economic Sanctions**

(October 25 and 28)

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2 - 4.

Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), chaps. TBA.

Daniel Drezner "Conflicting Expectation and the Paradox of Economic Coercion" International Studies Quarterly vol. 42 no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 709-31.

David Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debated and the Logic of Choice" International Security vol. 24 no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 80-107.

#### **VII. Alliances: the Logic of External Balancing**

(November 1 and 4)

Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser "An Economic Theory of Alliances" The Review of Economics and Statistics vol. 48 no. 3 (August 1996), pp. 266-279.

\*John Oneal "theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO" International Organization vol. 44 no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402.

\*James D. Morrow "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capabilities Aggregation Model of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science vol. 35 no. 4 (1991), pp. 903-933.

James D. Morrow "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security." International Organization vol. 47 no. 2 (1993), pp. 207-233.

\*Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patters in Moltipolarity" International Organization vol. 44 no 2 (Spring 1990) pp. 137-169.

### **VIII. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nature, Use and Deterrence Theory**

(November 8, 11 and 15)

Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 1.

Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989).

Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, chap. 5, 6, 7, and 9.

### **IX. Modern War and the Revolution in Warfare**

(November 16 and 17)

Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), excerpted in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War, pp. 511-522.

Stephen Biddle, "The New Way of War?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no.3 (May/ June 2002), pp. 138-144.

Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no.4 (July/August 2003), pp. 41-58.

Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (Free Press, 1991), chap. 7.

### **X. Civil Wars and (Humanitarian) Intervention**

(November 22 and 29)

Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil Wars," in Art and Jervis, International Politics, pp. 439-460.

Richard Betts, "Delusions of Impartiality," Foreign Affairs, vol.73 no.6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-32. (Excerpt in Betts Conflict After the Cold War)

Chaim Kaufmann, "See No Evil: Why America Doesn't Stop Genocide," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 142-149. (Excerpt in Art and Jervis International Politics)

Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance." Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 142-149.

Paul Collier, "The Market for Civil War" in Art and Jervis, International Politics, pp. 489-495

James Dobbins "The United States and Nation-Building" in Art and Jervis, International Politics, pp. 518-524.

### **XI. Asymmetrical Conflict and Terrorism**

(December 2 and 6)

Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," International Security, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93-128.

Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no.1 (Spring 2002), pp. 19-36. (Excerpt in Betts Conflict After the Cold War)

Jessica Stern "Terrorists Motivations and Unconventional Weapons." in Lavoy et. al. Planning the Untinkable, chap. 8.

Martha Crenshaw, "The Globalization of Terror" Current History vol. 100 no. 65 (December 2001), pp. 425-432. (in Betts Conflict After the Cold War)

Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War" in Martha Crenshaw, ed. Terrorism in Context (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)

## **XII. Just and Unjust War?**

(December 9 and 13)

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, 1977), chaps. TBA.

Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb," in Fussell, Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays (Summit Books, 1988).

"An Exchange of Views" (rebuttal by Michael Walzer and surrebuttal by Fussell) in Fussell, Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays.