Tri Vi Dang
Research Papers with Policy Implications
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Equity Markets |
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Market Sentiment and Innovation Activities There are social costs of deflating stock market bubbles |
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Information Disclosure, Intertemporal Risk Sharing and Stock Prices There is no single firm’s disclosure policy that all investors agree upon |
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Political connection is a determinant of market valuations of firms
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Disruptive Regulation: Theory and Evidence Regulation can cause a panic selloff of stocks by disrupting normal trading behaviors of individual investors |
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Banking |
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Firms Households Investors |
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Funding Markets |
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There are social costs of transparent banks
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Information Provision in Over-the-Counter Markets Having debt investors pay for rating services is welfare reducing |
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Shadow Banking Modes: The Chinese versus US System There are different ways to maintain information insensitivity and stability |
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Information Acquisition, Noise Trading and Speculation in Double Auction Markets Centralizing markets can reduce welfare
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Lending Relationships and the Transmission of Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Banks transmit monetary policy effects to firms |
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The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information Transaction tax reduces welfare in debt funding markets |
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Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises Only government can recreate information insensitivity of debt in crises
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Insurance Markets |
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Real Estate Markets |
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Insurance and the Extensive and Intensity Margin of Moral Hazard: Evidence from China
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The Real Estate Game in China: Theory and Test
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